This paper shows that households with positional concerns and convex status utility use gambling to attempt leapfrogging in the social hierarchy. We test this theoretical prediction relying on household data that is representative for Germany, proxying the status orientation of households by their expenditures for conspicuous consumption. Our empirical results strongly indicate that households who care about status are more likely to participate in gambling and invest more in gambling, while they save less.
Introduction

Motivation and main results
The idea that relative positions in society influence well-being and behavior has taken a stronghold in economics. People compare themselves to others in a wide variety of aspects of life, with important repercussions on happiness. For instance, Dohmen et al. (2011) provide evidence for the importance of relative income for subjective well-being using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Further empirical evidence for the importance of relative income positions for individual happiness and actions can be found in Stutzer (2004) and Frey et al. (2008) , for instance. For individuals who care very much about status but who have limited access to the legitimate means for attaining the goal of economic success such as an elite education, a pressure arises that necessitates coping behavior. We argue that gambling is a means of coping with the discrepancy between the desired status and the bleak prospects of achieving it via traditional channels.
1 Despite the extremely low probability of winning and the low pay-out ratio (for example, Haisley et al. 2008 report that people received only 53 cents in return for every dollar spent on lottery tickets over the years in the US), gambling offers an unparalleled possibility to leapfrog in the status hierarchy.
This paper explores whether households who attach greater importance to their relative position are more likely to gamble and to spend more on gambling activities. We use a data set that is representative for Germany and comprises household characteristics, a detailed breakdown of household expenditures, and information about household income.
A reasonable measure for the importance attached to status considerations is thus central to our endeavor but is usually difficult to obtain in the field. In this paper, we make use of households' expenditures for conspicuous consumption as a proxy for status preferences.
Conspicuous consumption (Veblen 1899) refers to consumption that aims to reveal one's economic status to others. To establish one's economic status relative to others, consumption is often used as a signal (see, e.g., Corneo and Jeanne 1998, Heffetz 2011) . This is due to the fact that many consumption choices are easily observable by others, whereas aspects such as financial wealth are not readily observed. Both the fact that relative concerns are important and that goods differ with regard to their positionality (i.e. that certain goods have a higher relevance for relative standing in society) have been confirmed in several empirical studies, among them Alpizar et al. (2005) , Carlsson et al. (2007) , Hillesheim and Mechtel (2013) , Hemenway (1998, 2005) . Cars are usually considered as a prime example of a positional good. Along these lines, Winkelmann (2012) establishes for Switzerland that the prevalence of luxury cars in one's own municipality decreases income satisfaction, and Kuhn et al. (2010) find that neighbors of people who won a car in the lottery have significantly higher levels of car consumption than others. Using expenditures for conspicuous consumption as a proxy for the strength of households' positional concerns, we find that a strong status orientation indeed makes participation in gambling and a higher extent of involvement more likely. This supports the hypothesis that many status-oriented individuals seek opportunities to "correct" their low status and find one in gambling. In contrast, traditional saving, which may be an alternative way of improving one's absolute (although not necessarily relative) standing in the future, is less important for households with strong status concerns.
The paper at hand contributes in several ways to existing knowledge. First, we document that status orientation is an important motive for taking part in gambling. This finding is of importance, given that no definite answer has yet been found to explain why people play lotteries, although several attempts have been made (see Ariyabuddhiphongs 2011 for a recent survey). Even though we do not consider the motivation described in this paper to be all-encompassing, it certainly is a valuable addition to the existing theories. Second, we contribute to the literature about the repercussions of individuals having positional concerns.
Given that gambling has a negative expected payoff, taking part in it lowers the economic status of those trying to leapfrog in the hierarchy by its utilization in expectation. Moreover, people with strong status considerations seem to substitute gambling for traditional wealth formation. This adds to the adverse consequences already established in the literature. For example, Neeman (2010, 2012) show that conspicuous consumption may influence the likelihood of poverty traps, and Frank (2000 Frank ( , 2008 argues that conspicuous consumption may use up resources otherwise spent for healthcare, among other things.
Relation to the literature
Our paper is most closely related to Haisley et al. (2008) who conducted two experiments dealing with subjective relative income and lottery ticket purchases. Subjects were asked to complete surveys, then handed five dollar bills for doing so, and afterwards were offered lottery tickets in exchange for the five dollars received. In Experiment 1, respondents had to check the applicable income bracket for their yearly income while completing the survey.
The brackets were manipulated in a way so as to make some subjects perceive that they were earning very little income. These subjects subsequently purchased a higher number of tickets on average. The second experiment tested whether or not the suggestion that middle-class and rich people often have better access to aspects related to success would motivate low-income people to opt more often for the supposedly class-free lottery. The results are again in support of the hypothesis. Our study is complementary to Haisley et al. (2008) . Our analysis builds on actual consumption patterns observed for a substantial number of individuals at several points in time. At the same time, the underlying behavioral model is closely related. Our results suggest that many individuals feel pressure given that the desired status will in all likelihood remain out of reach, and that these subjects consider gambling as probably the only legitimate channel that promises "correction" and is similarly accessible to low-status households.
The prior empirical literature on lottery play has largely been concerned with the question about its potential regressivity (see, e.g., Beckert and Lutter 2009 , Clotfelter and Cook 1987 , Crowley et al. 2012 , Farrell and Walker 1999 , Perez and Humphreys 2011 , Worthington 2001 ). In contrast, Kearney (2005) explores whether households substitute lottery expendi-tures for other gambling expenditures when a state lottery becomes available, and whether households respond to changes of the lottery's expected value. Our findings support the previous studies in that the income elasticity of expenditures on gambling is strictly less than one in all of our empirical models. It is important to note that our key explanatory variable that reflects the importance of positional concerns is a significant predictor even though we simultaneously include the level of income as an explanatory variable. In other words, our results are distinct from simply stating that poorer households find gambling more appealing.
Even among middle-class households, for example, we can explain differential engagement in gambling by reference to the importance attached to status.
When testing for the explanatory power of status orientation, we seek to control for socio-economic and demographic determinants of gambling and thereby also consider the influence of the region, urbanization, education, and gender, yielding a host of findings secondary to our result on the effect of the importance attached to relative position. We thereby contribute to the evolving literature on gender effects (see, e.g., Andreoni and Vesterlund 2001, Croson and Gneezy 2007) and comparisons between East and West German households (e.g., Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln 2007 , Brosig et al. 2011 , Friehe and Mechtel forthcoming, Heineck and Süssmuth forthcoming, Ockenfels and Weimann 1999 , Rainer and Siedler 2009 , Torgler 2003 . Our regression results suggest that women are much less interested in gambling. One possible interpretation may be that our approximation of status concerns does not capture all of the possible gender differences, and that women are less concerned about relative position. However, the findings on the effect of gender on the strength of positional concerns hitherto are ambiguous (Alpizar et al. 2005 , Corazzini et al. 2012 , Dohmen et al. 2011 , Friehe and Mechtel forthcoming, and Pingle and Mitchell 2002 The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a simple theoretical model to derive our central hypothesis regarding the influence of a greater status orientation on the involvement in lottery. We describe the data used for our analysis in Section 3, while Section 4 contains our empirical analysis. The last section concludes.
Theoretical model
In this section, we describe a simple model of consumer decision-making. 2 The comparativestatics analysis will deliver the result that greater importance attached to the relative position makes more investment in the lottery optimal when status utility is sufficiently convex.
Consider a representative household with preferences for consumption and relative standing. We assume that well-being can be represented by the following utility function:
where x and y are the household's consumption levels of the positional and the non-positional good, and S is the relative standing. The utility from consumption is increasing at a diminishing rate, that is, both u ′ > 0 > u ′′ and v ′ > 0 > v ′′ hold in addition to the assumptions lim x→0 u ′ = ∞ and lim y→0 v ′ = ∞. The marginal utility from an improvement in relative standing is positive and may in principle be either decreasing or increasing. For example, Robson (1992) assumes that utility is strictly convex in status, whereas Corneo (2002) supposes a strictly concave relationship. Our specification of T implies that we consider utility separable in consumption utility and utility from status considerations, a case between absolute consumption and relative standing being complements or substitutes. The scalar g ≥ 0 represents the importance given to relative standing compared to absolute consumption.
Relative standing is determined by comparing the individual level of absolute consumption of the status-relevant good x with the average level of absolute consumptionx. We follow Card et al. (2012) , Falk and Knell (2004) , and Konrad and Lommerud (1993) , among others, and specify
The household has fixed income I and may participate in a lottery. The lottery pays Bl in the winning state of the world (which occurs with probability 1 − p), given an investment of l in both states of the world and B > 1. That is, we assume for simplicity that a higher investment influences only the payout of the lottery, but not the winning probability.
Lotteries usually have a negative expected payoff, EV = (1 − p)(Bl − l) − pl. As a result, we obtain
In other words, each dollar spent in the lottery pays less than a dollar back in expected terms. In most scenarios, this is due to (1 − p) being small. For example, Haisley et al. (2008) report that the average expected value of a dollar spent on lottery tickets was -.47 dollars. We have to distinguish between two different levels of available income that is left for consumption expenditures, depending on whether the winning state M or the no win state N materializes:
where l ≥ 0 is a choice variable of the household.
The household seeks to
where we use x j = I j − y j , j = M, N. That is, we assume that the consumption levels of the positional and non-positional good can be determined conditional on the state of the world.
The first-order conditions are given by
where v ′ j is a shorthand for v ′ (y j ) and so on. The optimal consumption of y in state j levels the marginal utility and the marginal costs, where the latter is given by the reduction in the consumption of the positional good, affecting consumption and status utility.
In our empirical analysis, we are interested in the consequences of variety regarding the importance attached to relative standing. This translates into different levels of g in the present stylization. In this regard, we arrive at our first observation.
Lemma 1 Households with little concern for status (i.e., households for which g → 0 holds)
will not participate in a lottery with negative expected value.
This follows from the fact that the household spends more on x in state M than in state N, diminishing utility with respect to the good x, and (3).
As a next step, we turn to households with a non-negligible weight g. When the household chooses to invest in the lottery, the condition ET l = 0 together with (3) implies
This in turn means that
where the left-hand side is greater than zero due to the fact that the household spends more on the positional good in the winning state of the world and that the marginal utility from consumption is diminishing. This allows us to conclude:
Lemma 2 Households who invest in a lottery with negative expected value must have status utility that is sufficiently strictly convex.
In other words, households who attach importance to relative standing but have concave status utility w should not participate in a lottery with a negative expected value.
Next, we present results from a comparative-statics analysis for subjects that do participate in the lottery. Our research question concerns the extent to which household investment in the lottery varies with their ambition for favorable status positions. The comparativestatic properties of the model follow from. In the following, we will disregard equilibrium effects on the level of comparison consumptionx.
The determinant of the 3×3 matrix on the left-hand side will be denoted H in our subsequent argumentation, and is supposed to be negative by the sufficient second-order conditions.
From the first-order conditions and the assumption that the sufficient second-order conditions are fulfilled, we obtain
We are interested in the expenditures for lotteries of status-oriented households, and therefore seek to interpret:
where
An increase in the importance attached to relative standing implies that both the beneficial comparison in the winning state of the world and the disadvantageous comparison in the losing state of the world have a greater impact on well-being. The former comparison gets even more favorable as a consequence of a greater investment in the lottery, whereas the latter one becomes more unfavorable. We have concluded in Lemma 2 that households who invest in the lottery must have strictly convex status utility. This can be used for the interpretation of (21), because the first term in the parentheses will be positive (due to
) and the second one will go to zero for w sufficiently convex.
Proposition 1 Households who attach more importance to relative standing are more likely to gamble.
Proposition 2 Households who participate in the lottery will invest the more in the lottery, the more importance they attach to relative standing for w sufficiently convex.
Data
The central testable predictions that follow from our simple theoretical model are that households with a greater emphasis on relative consumption (i) are more likely to gamble, and (ii)
will spend more on gambling. We test these hypotheses using data on households' expen- Testing our central predictions requires data on both households' expenditures on gambling activities and a measure for the strength of positional concerns. While the first kind of information is directly included in the EVS data, it is necessary to find an adequate proxy for the second kind of information. In this regard, we consider the importance of expenditures for conspicuous consumption, because conspicuous consumption can be understood - has gambling expenditures greater than 0). As a second step, we use detailed information on each household's gambling expenditures as the dependent variable in ordinary least squares estimations. Given the structure of our data with a significant share of households not engaging in gambling, it is important to test the robustness of our results by using other econometric approaches. In this respect, we estimated both double hurdle and tobit models in order to provide a reliable empirical analysis. Double hurdle models account for the fact that households have to decide on two questions: (1) whether they want to participate in gambling at all, and (2) how much they want to spend on gambling when they indeed participate. Contrary to the tobit model, the double-hurdle approach allows both steps of households' decision to be determined by different processes. The results of our logit and OLS estimations are strongly supported by the tobit and double hurdle models, such that we rely on the former in the main part of our analysis, as they ease the interpretation. Results from the latter are discussed when we present our robustness checks (see Section 4.2.2).
Our key explanatory variable ln(CC i ) represents the natural logarithm of household i's whenever the number of inhabitants of household i's city of residence exceeds 100,000. As a further control for a household's wealth, we include the variable Home owner i . This dummy variable takes the value of 1 whenever the household is the proprietor of its house or flat and 0 otherwise. Finally, empirical evidence suggests that education has an influence on gambling behavior (see, e.g., Beckert and Lutter 2009 , 2013 , and Perez and Humphreys 2011 . The EVS data allows us to incorporate information on educational levels into our econometric analysis. All waves contain information on whether a household's head holds a university degree and whether he or she has no school leaving certificate. Based on this information, we construct the dummy variables University degree i and No school certificate i .
Our full econometric model reads as follows:
where Dependent variable i is a dummy variable indicating any gambling activity in the first set of estimations and the natural logarithm of each household's gambling expenditures in the second set of estimations. D j contains dummies for wave j, j = 1998, 2003, 2008. As we will describe in more detail below, we start by estimating a model that includes only the explanatory variable related to conspicuous consumption, and then include more variables step-by-step until we end up with the full set of controls. In total, we have observations on i = 176, 751 households, but due to omissions regarding socio-demographic household characteristics our estimations that include the variables # of adults i , and # of children i are only based on 170, 780 households.
Results
We start by using the dummy variable Participation i as our dependent variable which takes the value of 1 whenever a household spends a positive amount of money on gambling and 0 otherwise. The model is estimated using a logit estimator with heteroskedasticity-consistent Huber-White standard errors. Table 3 reports average marginal effects for all continuous regressors and marginal effects for discrete changes from 0 to 1 for all dummy variables. In the first estimation, we consider the logarithm of conspicuous consumption expenditures as the only explanatory variable. Column (1) of Table 3 clearly indicates that the probability to participate in gambling is higher when the household spends more on conspicuous con-sumption. Next, we augment the model and stepwise include information about households' income levels, the stock of savings, and socio-demographic characteristics, until we end up with the model presented in equation (22) in Column (4). Our results reveal a highly significant effect of conspicuous consumption spending on the likelihood to spend a positive amount of money on gambling. The average marginal effect in our full model says that a 1%-increase in conspicuous consumption spending raises the probability to gamble by 3.2%.
The marginal effects of our additional control variables turn out to have the expected signs given previous research on gambling behavior: we find a positive effect of income and the stock of savings. Households with a female head are less likely to participate in gambling.
The marginal effect of Age i is positive and significant at the 1%-level, the quadratic term is negative and significant. Our results further show that households from the former German Democratic Republic are less likely to gamble. The same holds for home owners and households from urban areas. With respect to households' educational levels, we find that holding a university degree or having no school-leaving certificate significantly decreases the probability of having positive gambling expenditures.
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE
The second step of our econometric analysis focuses on the actual amount spent on gambling activities. Our dependent variable ln(Gambling expenditures i ) captures the natural logarithm of household i's spending on gambling. As is common in the respective literature on consumption (and gambling) expenditures, our dependent variable enters the econometric model in log-form which allows for an interpretation of the estimated coefficients in terms of elasticities. We will see in the robustness checks later on that our results also hold when including all monetary variables (expenditures, income, savings) in linear form. We perform a number of ordinary least squares regressions using the same set of explanatory variables as above. Table 4 shows the coefficients of these estimations. Our inferences regarding conspic-uous consumption are similar to those resulting from the logit estimations. A 1%-increase of expenditures on conspicuous goods increases gambling expenditures by 0.173% in our full model (Column 4). This finding supports our theoretical predictions: households which attach more importance to relative position (approximated by their consumption behavior) spend more on gambling. The signs and significance levels of our control variables resemble the ones presented in the logit estimations. Columns (5) to (8) of Table 4 rely on a restricted sample. Here, we focus only on households with a positive amount of spending on gambling activities. As can be seen from these estimations, there is still a positive coefficient of the explanatory variable that captures conspicuous consumption expenditures. Our logit estimations revealed that households with higher expenditures on conspicuous consumption are more likely to engage in gambling. Given this result, it is straightforward that the OLS point estimates of the regressions conditional on positive gambling expenditures are smaller than those of the unrestricted sample. However, the positive relationship between spending on conspicuous consumption and gambling expenditures is still highly significant.
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE
Robustness checks
In this section, we consider whether changing the precise definition of our key explanatory variable is critical to our results. Furthermore, we consider all monetary variables in linear form. Next, we discuss the results obtained from tobit and double-hurdle models. Table 5 contains a number of robustness checks. In Column (1), we utilize our intermediate definition of conspicuous consumption expenditures, while we rely on the definitions by Charles et. al (2009) and Heffetz (2011) in Columns (2) and (3). Applying these alternative measures does not change our conclusions. There is still a highly significant effect of conspicuous consumption expenditures on the probability to participate in gambling. Likewise, the results regarding our other control variables remain qualitatively unchanged. Note that we re-estimated every column of Table 3 . In order to save space, we only present the results from the full model in Table 5 . However, the results of these estimations not presented in Table 5 are also very similar to those presented in Table 3 . Our results so far support our theoretical prediction that households with a greater emphasis on conspicuous consumption are more likely to participate in gambling activities.
Varying the definition of the key explanatory variable
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE
As for the logit estimations, we also use the alternative definitions of conspicuous consumption as robustness checks in our OLS regressions. A selection of the corresponding results is presented in Table 6 . Our inferences are robust against the changes in the definition of the set of conspicuous goods; we find a highly significant positive effect of conspicuous consumption spending on households' gambling expenditures.
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE
Untransformed monetary variables and other econometric approaches
In addition to the regression results presented so far, we performed a number of further estimations to test for the robustness of our findings. First, we included the absolute levels of all monetary variables instead of their logs. Our inferences are robust to these changes; we still find a highly significant positive effect of conspicuous consumption expenditures on both the probability of engaging in gambling activities and the total amount spent on gambling.
We abstain from presenting these results in detail here. Results are available upon request.
Given the structure of our data, one might argue that our dependent variable is censored as a significant share of households do not spend any money on gambling. We make use of tobit estimations to address this fact. The results confirm our findings based on the OLS estimations, regardless of which conspicuous consumption definition we choose and regardless of whether we use the logs or the absolute values of the monetary variables. The signs and significance levels of all coefficients turn out to be the same as those presented in Table 4 .
However, the tobit model assumes that both the probability of engaging in gambling activities and the actual amount spent on gambling (if the household decides to have positive expenditures) are determined by the same process. This is in contrast to our empirical specification presented above, relying on a logit estimation to model the decision to participate in any gambling and then OLS estimations that focus on the amount spent on gambling (conditional on participation). Cragg (1971) presents the "double-hurdle" approach which allows both decisions to result from different processes. Following other studies using data of a similar structure, we relied on this approach and estimated a double-hurdle model using Stata's craggit command (Burke 2009) which combines a probit estimation with a truncated normal regression in the second step. Due to the similarity with our combined logit and OLS approach, these results are supportive of our previously presented findings. Detailed regression results are available upon request.
Given the stability of our central results when conducting these numerous robustness checks, we conclude that our results neither depend on the chosen estimation technique, the functional form of the econometric model nor on the definition of conspicuous consumption.
Overall, we find strong support for the predictions stemming from our theoretical model.
Households attaching a greater importance to relative position (as proxied by a household's emphasis on conspicuous consumption) are more likely to be extensively involved in gambling.
Repercussions of gambling participation for savings
A traditionally considered possibility of improving one's future well-being is saving money.
However, saving need not improve the relative standing. To shed some light on the interconnection between conspicuous consumption and savings, we re-estimate equation (22), taking the natural logarithm of household i's savings in the period under consideration as the dependent variable. Our ordinary least squares regression results are presented in Table   7 . The findings concerning conspicuous consumption are remarkable: irrespective of which definition of conspicuous consumption we apply, the coefficient reports a highly significant negative effect on savings. This result indicates that households substitute gambling for saving whenever they put great emphasis on relative consumption.
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE
Conclusion
The empirical importance of gambling is still a puzzle to many casual observers and researchers alike. We provide an explanation for the private desirability of gambling by referring to the empirically established fact that behavior is often motivated by (anticipated) outcomes of relative comparison. For many individuals who currently believe they have low economic status but at the same time put a lot of emphasis on relative standing when it comes to their well-being, winning the lottery may be the only legitimate way of significantly improving their relative position. Our empirical analysis strongly supports this idea, using household data representative for Germany and expenditures for conspicuous consumption as a proxy for the importance attached to status. In addition, our analysis yields results regarding the influence of numerous socio-economic and demographic variables, for example, showing that the likelihood of participation and the extent of involvement is lower for East German households.
Our results suggest that gamblers are often motivated by the prospect of leapfrogging in status. This result is of great policy importance, because gambling has a low pay-out ratio and exacerbates poverty in expected terms. Indeed, our results suggest that statusoriented households seem to substitute gambling for conventional savings. However, the appropriate policy response is not easy to identify. The importance attached to relative standing is a characteristic of preferences, which are not easily manageable by a policy maker. An alternative path open to policy makers would be to improve information about the availability of other means to improve status, although this is not likely to fully redress the problem. Another obvious possibility is further restricting the availability of gambling, while Haisley et al. (2008) suggest the use of lottery-linked savings accounts.
Notes
1 It is important to note that subjective status is relevant for privately optimal behavior, where this subjective position is partly determined by the individual when it determines the peer group, for example.
There is evidence that the respect and admiration one gets from interaction with face-to-face groups such as colleagues and friends are a major determinant of status concerns (see Anderson et al. 2012 , Clark and Senik 2010 , Senik 2009 ). As a result, even subjects with an objectively high status may perceive to be disadvantaged in this regard.
2 Konrad and Lommerud (1993) and Robson (1992) (i.e., 1993, 1998, 2003, 2008 Table 1 ). The control variables Female, Foreign, East Germany, City, Home owner, University degree, and No school certificate are dummy variables. All other explanatory variables are non-binary (see Table 2 for descriptive statistics). The dummy variable East Germany takes the value of 1 whenever a household is located in East Germany and the dummy variable City takes the value of 1 whenever a household resides in a city with more than 100, 000 inhabitants. The variables ln(income) and ln(savings) capture yearly household income and the stock of savings as a proxy for permanent income. Estimations include wave dummies. The number of children and/or adults is unclear for some households in the EVS data. We therefore end up using 170, 780 observations in estimations including these two explanatory variables (column 4). Heteroskedasticity-robust Huber-White standard errors are in brackets.
* significant at the 10 percent level, ** sign. at the 5 percent level, *** sign. at the 1 percent level. Table 1 ). The control variables Female, Foreign, East Germany, City, Home owner, University degree, and No school certificate are dummy variables. All other explanatory variables are non-binary (see Table 2 for descriptive statistics). The dummy variable East Germany takes the value of 1 whenever a household is located in East Germany and the dummy variable City takes the value of 1 whenever a household resides in a city with more than 100, 000 inhabitants. The variables ln(Income) and ln(Savings) capture yearly household income and the stock of savings as a proxy for permanent income. In columns (5) to (8), the sample is restricted to those households who spend a positive amount on gambling. Estimations include wave dummies. The number of children and/or adults is unclear for some households in the EVS data. We therefore end up using 170, 780 (80, 519) observations in estimations including these two explanatory variables (columns 4 and 8).
Heteroskedasticity-robust Huber-White standard errors are in brackets. * significant at the 10 percent level, ** sign. at the 5 percent level, *** sign. at the 1 percent level. Table 1 ). The control variables Female, Foreign, East Germany, City, Home owner, University degree, and No school certificate are dummy variables. All other explanatory variables are non-binary (see Table 2 for descriptive statistics). The dummy variable East Germany takes the value of 1 whenever a household is located in East Germany and the dummy variable City takes the value of 1 whenever a household resides in a city with more than 100, 000 inhabitants. The variables ln(income) and ln(savings) capture yearly household income and the stock of savings as a proxy for permanent income. Estimations include wave dummies. The number of children and/or adults is unclear for some households in the EVS data. We therefore end up using 170, 780 observations in estimations including these two explanatory variables (column 4). Heteroskedasticity-robust Huber-White standard errors are in brackets.
* significant at the 10 percent level, ** sign. at the 5 percent level, *** sign. at the 1 percent level. Table 1 ). The control variables Female, Foreign, East Germany, City, Home owner, University degree, and No school certificate are dummy variables. All other explanatory variables are non-binary (see Table 2 for descriptive statistics). The dummy variable East Germany takes the value of 1 whenever a household is located in East Germany and the dummy variable City takes the value of 1 whenever a household resides in a city with more than 100, 000 inhabitants. The variables ln(Income) and ln(Savings) capture yearly household income and the stock of savings as a proxy for permanent income. In columns (4) to (6), the sample is restricted to those households who spend a positive amount on gambling. Estimations include wave dummies. Heteroskedasticity-robust Huber-White standard errors are in brackets. * significant at the 10 percent level, ** sign. at the 5 percent level, *** sign. at the 1 percent level. Table 1 ). The control variables Female, Foreign, East Germany, City, Home owner, University degree, and No school certificate are dummy variables. All other explanatory variables are non-binary (see Table 2 for descriptive statistics). The dummy variable East Germany takes the value of 1 whenever a household is located in East Germany and the dummy variable City takes the value of 1 whenever a household resides in a city with more than 100, 000 inhabitants. The variables ln(Income) and ln(Savings) capture yearly household income and the stock of savings as a proxy for permanent income. Estimations include wave dummies. Heteroskedasticity-robust Huber-White standard errors are in brackets. * significant at the 10 percent level, ** sign. at the 5 percent level, *** sign. at the 1 percent level. 
